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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D.C.

I-12051/9

30 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between Mr. Irwin and Mr. Strauss, Paris,
18 December 1958

U. S. IRBM's.

Mr. Irwin referred to Mr. Strauss' conversations with Secretary McElroy during the December 17 luncheon, and stated that he had discussed with General Norstad the U.S. production schedules for IRBM's. Under the present schedule, the U.S. intends to terminate current production at 8 squadrons. To accomplish this economically, it is necessary to start closing the line, "to buy-out," by 1 April. If additional squadrons are desired by NATO it will be necessary to approach the U.S. prior to April 1, 1959. If that should be done, the U.S. could consider the proposal and readjust production schedules. Having clarified this timing with General Norstad, we consider the question of IRBM's being deployed in Germany first a problem for military and political decision by NATO. If NATO should determine to deploy IRBM's, then it would become a matter for bilateral negotiation between Germany and the U.S.

Mr. Strauss stated that he was happy to have this information and would notify the Chancellor who would have time to consider it over the Christmas holidays.

SSM's and SAM's.

Mr. Irwin referred to the German proposal for additional SAM units, and suggested that this too is a NATO problem. The proposed increase would have to be considered by NATO.

Mr. Strauss stated this is not primarily a NATO problem. MC 70 establishes a German requirement for 40 SSM units. It does pose, however, some real difficulties for Germany. Of total NATO requirements some 35% of all SSM units and over 50% of all SAM units are scheduled to be stationed in Germany. The acquisition of land and other problems has caused Germany to limit its SSM commitment to 28 battalions. Germany is anxious to meet MC 70 and might consider raising its commitment to 36 or even 40 battalions; but if this were done, it would necessarily be at the expense of conventional artillery or other units.

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Mr. Irwin asked if any change from 28 to 40 battalions would be communicated to General Norstad through discussion or agreement or other communication.

Mr. Strauss replied that German intention in relation to projected commitment is communicated to General Norstad and NATO through German reply to ARQ.

Mr. Irwin then asked Mr. Strauss if he had any indication of General Norstad's interest in increased missile units at the expense of other units.

Mr. Strauss stated that this is part of the general problem which he had discussed with General Norstad. In his estimate, General Norstad wanted SAM units brought to full MC-70 requirements.

Mr. Irwin stated the implementation of this program requires further contact and confirmation with General Norstad and eventual coordination with U. S. production programs and MAP schedules.

Mr. Strauss wished to make clear the increase in SAM at the expense of other units will not affect Germany's 12-division commitment. It will be done by adjusting internal division organization and cuts in corps units. He further stated, however, that forces must not be allowed to get out of proper balance.

U. S. NIKE Bns.

Mr. Irwin expressed our understanding that Germany is accepting only 3 NIKE battalions of the total offered. He asked what the plans are for reaching the goals just discussed.

Mr. Strauss replied that it is 3 at the moment, but Germany may increase to 6 NIKE battalions, the rest to be Hawk. It is a complicated problem to resolve.

Mr. Irwin recognized the difficulty but stated it would assist greatly the U. S. if we could have a clear picture of Germany's intention.

Mr. Strauss said they are emphasizing the Hawk. Probably 6 battalions of NIKE's and the rest Hawks.

LAND ACQUISITION AND HAWK PRODUCTION.

Mr. Irwin indicated the acquisition of sites is a problem not only for the German battalions, but for U. S. and allied battalions and asked that the program be accelerated.

Mr. Strauss stated that any land acquisition is difficult in Germany. In relation to SAM, SHAPE first asked for the entire MC-70 commitment to be 100% NIKE in a belt or point defense. Later the problem of the European production of Hawk arose. He stated that the question had been examined and they now feel Hawk can meet their low level air defense requirement. They hope that with modification it can be adapted for shipboard antiaircraft, to be used by the navy which is composed of small vessels. They cannot carry out both the NIKE and Hawk program and the use of Hawk eases their land problem.

He further stated that from their knowledge of the [] and their experience in World War II, they feel at least [] of all attacks on Germany will be low level. They foresee a forward belt of Hawks backed by NIKE's. At present, 6 NIKE and the rest Hawks is their technical limit. It is not a money problem; it is technical personnel.

Mr. Irwin expressed the view that this problem is becoming more common in all fields.

Mr. Strauss agreed that this is true. At first, they thought in terms of 3 NIKE battalions, but they will increase their request probably to 6 battalions. This may assist in resolving some U. S. problems. He said Germany intends initially to join in the European production of Hawk, but would like to see both the high and low level performance extended. []

[]

Mr. Irwin felt that both forms of defense are important.

Mr. Strauss agreed.

Mr. Irwin said we would like to know as soon as possible if they are now considering 6 NIKE battalions and indicated that we are very pleased to know they are moving into the European Hawk program.

Mr. Strauss said that the production of Hawk is now decided.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT.

As a third point, Mr. Irwin wanted to discuss nuclear weapons. European deployment conforms to SACEUR's plans. The U. S. makes weapons available to General Norstad as CINCEUR. As SACEUR, he determines deployments, including those in Germany. We would hope

he deploys atomic weapons in Germany for both German and U. S. forces. Mr. Irwin pointed out it must be understood, however, that these deployments change from time to time. There is no commitment to fill stockpiles or permanently assign them. The deployment plan is not rigid, but shifts to meet changing strategy, delivery units, and so on.

Mr. Strauss replied that they understand this. Weapons cannot be a lifetime commitment. []

Stock

[]

Mr. Irwin replied that we could probably always use more, but unused space does not indicate shortage. It may not be practical or feasible to fill storage sites.

Mr. Strauss said that in time they would need [] storage sites; however, they are not pressing for this. What they want is the accomplished fact of some weapons in their site. He wants to stop the political fight that has been going on for over a year. To this end, they have an air strike wing ready, well-trained and with all supporting facilities. He said that later schedules can follow the NATO program, but now he wants some weapons, even if token in number, to be an established fact. Accomplishment stops argument. This has been the history in Germany with respect to, first, establishing armed forces; second, conscription; and now he is convinced nuclear weapons will be the same. The fact of deployment will stop this argument.

Six

Mr. Irwin said we would like to see weapons deployed in stockpiles as decided by SACEUR. This does not necessarily mean filling any site, but rather the provision of some nuclear weapons. []

Note

[]

Mr. Strauss replied that this will stop Soviet propaganda moves. Political argument will stop when the first bomb moves in.

NATO IRBM PRODUCTION.

Mr. Irwin asked if Germany would support the IRBM production program.

Mr. Strauss replied that there are some problems to decide. Three methods of approach have been outlined:

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1. Buy U. S.
2. Make a "Chinese copy."
3. Develop a new weapon.

Germany feels a combination of Plans 2 and 3 are best. French, Belgians, the Netherlands and Germany should join in reproducing a U. S. system. He felt they should start with a known system and attempt to improve it. This is what Germany did with Curtis Hornet Motors; started with regular production and then advanced the design.

Mr. Irwin indicated this is fine from our point of view. He thought Plan 1 would have had one great difficulty -- money and foreign exchange.

Mr. Strauss said they would probably like to buy a few and then move forward with production.

Mr. Irwin suggested that the United Kingdom's industrial knowledge and capacity not be overlooked; he believes the U. K. would be able to contribute substantially to the production in Europe of a second generation IRBM.

Mr. Strauss said they want the U. K. to participate.

F-104 PRODUCTION.

Mr. Strauss stated he is also interested in the F-104 as a standard European aircraft. Germany did not want English aircraft. The production base is too small. We may buy a few, say, 50, but the P-1 will be the last English aircraft. He indicated the Mirage is another problem confronting Germany. The French are proud of the aircraft, but he has resisted. He invited France sometime ago to join Germany in producing 104's. At that time the French were not interested. *State*

Mr. Strauss felt if this aircraft could also be tied to Greek and Turkish aircraft programs, they could establish a broad base for production. They are not trying to expand the small German aircraft industry; they are interested in a program of standardization. There are too many types in Europe. They may need one more, a simple aircraft. Two types, one simple and one more complex; Europe should standardize on these. He indicated Prince Bernhard wants the N-156, but he did not think the Netherlands would be happy with this aircraft. There are too many types in Europe now.

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Mr. Irwin stated that in all this planning a timely decision will help us in our various programs.

Mr. Strauss said they don't want to wait for a European decision on aircraft production. This is too slow. They will buy some aircraft but expect to work with Lockheed and Western Electric to produce the rest in Germany. They plan contracts to be completed by 15 January to 30 January and plan to initiate production 15 March 1959.

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